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Introduction
The former Chairman of the Federal Reserve (Fed), Alan Greenspan, when writing about his inside view on how monetary policy is instituted, states that the Fed is well aware of the effects of uncertainty on macroeconomic variables (Greenspan 2004 The relevance of macroeconomic uncertainty for rule formation of central banks has been extensively discussed in the theoretical literature. Swanson (2004) states that "a standard result in the literature of monetary policy is that of certaintyequivalence: Given the expected value of the state variables of the economy, policy should be independent of the higher moments of those variables." This view is based on a series of seminal papers. Orphanides (2003) shows that certainty-equivalence holds for models with unobserved or real-time data and emphasizes that the independence of the parameters holds only if the optimal rule is based on the expected values of the macroeconomic variables rather than their measured values. Svensson and Woodford (2003) find that "the optimal response to the optimal estimate of potential output displays certainty equivalence, whereas the optimal response to the imperfect observation of output depends on the noise in this observation." These and all subsequent papers on certainty-equivalence deal with more or less complex but linear models of the economy, which is another shortcoming in the view of central bankers. Greenspan (2004) also states that in making their decisions the Fed takes into account the insufficiencies of the commonly used linear macroeconomic models.
Nevertheless, to this point in time, the certainty-equivalence principle holds-to the best of our knowledge-for all derivations of monetary policy rules in linear New Keynesian models (NKM) (see also the textbooks by Gali 2008 and Walsh 2010) .
So far, few alternatives have been analyzed as, for instance, Swanson (2004) shows that an exception from the result of certainty-equivalence is possible only if the policy rule is expressed in reduced form and relevant unobserved variables are estimated in a signal extraction sense. Consequently, the paper's first contribution is to close the gap between academic theory and the de facto behavior of central bankers. We show that certainty-equivalence in NKM holds if and only if the model is solved by log-linearization. The basic intuition is quite simple. Log-linearizing the variables within the expectation operator eliminates higher order moments. In con-trast, using a second-order Taylor approximation preserves the second moments and the variance remains relevant for the optimal policy rule. Accordingly, we present a modification of a forward-looking Taylor rule, which integrates two variables measuring the uncertainty of inflation and GDP growth forecasts into an otherwise standard NKM. This result is generic to NKM and not specific to our (standard) setup. One implication is that Taylor 1 Such an asymmetric loss function might also be relevant in the context of macroeconomic forecasts. As mentioned before, monetary policy is supposed to be forward-looking. Consequently, policymakers have to deal with more or less certain forecasts when they determine the appropriate level of the policy rate.
They have to decide whether to weigh the upward and downward risks of a forecast as balanced, or to give one of these risks more weight in formulating their decision.
For instance, a high degree of inflation forecast uncertainty and a relatively stronger aversion of overshooting the inflation target (IT) should translate into a positive re-action to the uncertainty of inflation expectations. Similarly, when the central bank is more recession-averse and observes a high degree of GDP forecast uncertainty it should lower its policy rate. Consequently, there are possible scenarios when a central bank should react to the second moment of inflation or growth expectations forecasts from this point of view as well.
2
Given the scant empirical literature on how central bankers deal with the uncertainty of macroeconomic forecasts, the paper's second contribution is to test a forward-looking Taylor rule with inflation forecast uncertainty and GDP growth forecast uncertainty empirically. For that purpose, we rely on the dataset of individual forecasters provided by Consensus Economics and use the standard deviation of individual forecasts around the median forecast as proxy for forecast uncertainty.
3
Our sample covers three economies (euro area, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) and the period 1992Q4−2014Q2, which allows us to compare not only the reaction to uncertainty of several central banks, but also to look at their forecast error risk aversion during normal times and during the episode of the global financial crisis and thereafter.
Our results indicate that, in fact, real policy behavior accounts for uncertainty in accordance with the model's predictions. All three central banks significantly react to inflation forecast uncertainty but not to GDP growth forecast uncertainty. They reduce their policy rates in times of higher inflation expectation uncertainty with an average effect of more than 25 basis points. The inclusion of the second moments of forecasts leads to a slightly better model fit, lower standard errors of regression, and an improvement of the information criteria in the regressions.
The remainder of this paper is as follow. Section 2 presents the modified New Keynesian model. Section 3 introduces the data set and the empirical methodology.
Section 4 shows the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Model
In this section, we present a modification of an otherwise standard NKM, which results in a monetary policy reaction function that also includes the second moments 2 In addition, an asymmetric loss function can be relevant in the forecast-generating process as well. See, for instance, Patton and Timmermann (2007) and Capistran (2008) . If central bankers fear under-predicting inflation they will adjust their forecast of inflation up by a factor that is increasing in forecast uncertainty.
3 These forecasts are a reasonable proxy for central bank forecasts as professional forecasters have very similar backgrounds to staff economists at central banks.
of inflation expectations and GDP growth expectations. 4 The model setup follows Gali (2008) . The only difference to the standard setup is that we relax the solution method of log-linearization and use a second-order approximation.
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Consumer, Prices, and Aggregation. We start with a standard monopolistic Dixit-Stiglitz type competition model. Firms have pricing power on a continuum of differentiated goods indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that the elasticity of substitution between goods ε > 1 is constant and common amongst all economic subjects.
C(i) denotes the consumption level and P (i) is the price of good i. 5 Consequently, the total expenditure on consumption is 1 0
The representative consumer minimizes the expenditure for C units of aggregate consumption yielding the following Lagrangian
Using the first-order conditions
which-after taking the ε ε−1 th root and integration with respect to i-yields the price index 4 Other approaches to introduce uncertainty variables into a monetary policy rule like, for instance, Swanson (2004) are based on an signaling approach and yield uncertainty dependent coefficients for inflation and output instead of separable coefficients for inflation and output uncertainty as our approach does. 5 To keep the notation as simple as possible we omit the time index as long as we treat only a single period.
The Firms' Problem. K denotes the firms' cost functions in real terms of quantities Y (i) and Z(i) ≡ K (Y (i)) the marginal costs. We assume that the log deviations of marginal costs from their long-run trend values z(i) are linear, that is,
The firm's real profits are given by
Each firm takes the demand function and aggregate prices as given since any single firm is too small to directly influence other firms or the whole economy. It sets its own price P (i) to maximize profits. Standard optimization yields a fixed mark-up over marginal costs:
We denote the log deviation of individual prices and the price index from their long-term values by p ≡ ln P − ln P and p(i) ≡ ln P (i) − ln P . Taking logs and substituting the demand function in logs y(i) − y = −ε(p(i) − p) yields
Price Rigidity: Calvo Pricing. Each firm has a constant probability 1 − φ to be able to update its price in each period and the turns are independently distributed among firms and periods. This implies a probability of φ j for having the same price in j periods as today. We denote the reset price as x t = p t (i). This is not necessarily the optimal price p * t , because firms will act on the probability of not to being able to adjust prices in future periods. Indeed, the optimal reset price is determined by the discounted sum of future profits. We use a quadratic approximation of the per-period deviation from maximum-possible profit with β as discount factor
The first-order condition is
We know from its definition and the definition of the price updating probability φ that the aggregate price level evolves according to
Using (10) to substitute for x t yields
(12) can further be simplified by defining inflation as π t ≡ p t − p t−1 to
Recalling the optimal price equation (8) 
The Quadratic IS curve
Households maximize their discounted expected utility E t ∞ s=t β t−s U (C s ) under a dynamic budget constraint with the interest rate i t . This leads to the Euler equation
Consumption enters the utility as C
1−σ t
with an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 1/σ which yields
We define the growth rate ∆y t+1 = ln Y t+1 −ln Y t and the output gap y t = y t −y ss .
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It is consistent with the long-run equilibrium to choose β =
1+r
with r being the real interest rate which results in
We now deviate from the standard derivation of the IS curve and use a quadratic
x 2 and take the log-lins of the interest rate
Solving for the output gap yields the quadratic IS curve
The derivations of the NKPC and the IS curve are both microfounded and follow the lines of the standard approaches. In both cases (Equations (9) and (17)), we use a second order approximation. However, variance parameters only enter the IS curve. In the derivation of the IS curve, we approximate the Euler equation, which includes non-t-measurable variables, that is, the future price level and future output. Consequently, higher order moments of these variables remain after the second order approximation. In the derivation of the NKPC, we approximate the objective function around the t-measurable optimizing variable x t in the expectation operator. Consequently, the first-order conditions are linear in x t and also in the 8 It is straightforward to show that the growth rate of the output and the growth rate of the output gap is the same: ∆y t+1 = y t+1 − y ss − (y t − y ss ) = ∆ y t+1 .
9 This step is the crucial difference to the standard derivation of the IS curve. If we apply a log-linearization, the term 1 2 x 2 would be left out. In this case, the term within the expectation operator would be linear and we were left with separated terms of expected inflation and the expected output gap, that is, the standard derivation of the IS curve. Note that, however, the inclusion of moments higher than second order would make the model intractable.
log price level.
10 Thus, the main difference is that the approximated variable is t-measurable in case of the NKPC but not in case of the IS curve.
Monetary Policy under Discretion
The central bank minimizes squared fluctuations of inflation around a constant target π * being set to zero for convenience and squared fluctuations of the output gap weighted by δ > 0
by choosing its policy rate i T t . The central bank is assumed to be unable to commit to the fully optimal, that is, inertial, policy plan. Instead, monetary policy operates under discretion and takes expectations of future inflation and future output as given.
Recall the NKPC (14) and the quadratic IS curve (18)
where the parameters β, κ, and σ are strictly positive. Minimizing equation (19) with respect to inflation and the output gap, subject to the NKPC and the quadratic IS curve, results in two first-order conditions λ = −π t and λ = δ κ y t that can be combined to the standard targeting rule
According to this rule, the central bank "leans against the wind" and depresses the real economy to counteract positive deviations from the inflation target. The strength of the economic contraction needed to fight an inflation deviation increases in the slope of the NKPC and decreases in the central bank's weight on output stabilization. Inserting the standard targeting rule (20) into the NKPC yields:
To obtain the interest rate rule followed by the central bank we insert (21) into the quadratic IS curve and solve for the central bank's policy rate:
Finally, we utilize the "lean against the wind" condition to clarify the relation between the coefficients and get as a target interest rate
with
The term ξ can be neglected as the squared expected inflation rate 12 and the squared expected output gap growth rate take very small values for advanced economies.
Data and Empirical Methodology 3.1 Data
Our empirical analysis focuses on three mature economies: the euro area (EA), Sweden (SWE), and the United Kingdom (UK). The sample countries and the period covered for each central bank is summarized in Table 1 . Our data set includes the end of quarter policy rates obtained from the central bank websites. In addition, for each country there are up to 34 individual forecasts by Consensus Economics for expected inflation and real GDP growth, separately for the current calendar year and the next calendar year. In a first step, these individual forecasts are transformed into 12-month ahead forecasts using the following formula.
E t,i x t+12 is the 12-month ahead forecast and E t,m,i x cy as well as E t,m,i x ny are the corresponding forecasts for the current calendar year and the next calendar year. i denotes the individual forecaster and m refers to the month in which the forecast was made, that is, m = 3 for March, m = 6 for June, m = 9 for September and, m = 12
for December. In a second step, we calculate the median of these individual forecasts for each country and month. In the following, we will refer to these medians as "expected inflation" and "expected GDP growth." Finally, we obtain the standard deviation around the median for each country and forecast to proxy the "uncertainty of inflation expectations" and "uncertainty of growth expectations." In contrast to the theoretical model in Section 2, we use the standard deviation around the median instead of the variance as the standard deviation has the same dimension as the median and, therefore, these figures are easier to interpret. 
Empirical Methodology
To assess the impact of inflation and GDP growth forecast uncertainty on the central bank policy rate we, first, estimate a forward-looking Taylor rule without forecast uncertainty as a benchmark. To reconcile our theoretical model in Section 2 with the recent empirical literature (Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2012), we allow for both, interest rate smoothing of second-order and a first-order autoregressive error term specification:
Note that the results below hold qualitatively when using the variance around the median instead of the standard deviation. See Table A3 in the Appendix. 15 See also Rudebusch (2006) and Consolo and Favero (2009) for a discussion of whether to include a partial adjustment mechanism and/or an autoregressive error term into the reaction function.
T t is the policy rate, E t π t+12 − π * the 12-month ahead expected inflation rate minus the IT, that is, the "expected inflation gap," and E t y t+12 − y * the 12-month ahead expected GDP growth rate minus potential output, that is, the "expected output Next, we augment (M1) with variables measuring the uncertainty of inflation forecasts and the uncertainty of GDP growth forecasts:
SD(E t π t+12 ) is the uncertainty of inflation expectations and SD(E t y t+12 ) is the uncertainty of growth forecasts. A positive (and significant) value for γ 1 or γ 2 16 We choose not to add an exchange rate variable. Research on estimated as well as optimal Taylor rules (see, among others, Clarida 2001; Collins and Siklos 2004) suggests that adding this variable does not substantively change inferences based on the standard Taylor rule specification. 17 This also reflects common practice by many central banks in their communications as these focus on expected GDP growth rather than on the expected GDP gap (Gerlach 2007) , probably due to the difficulty of measuring the latter in real-time (see also Orphanides and van Norden 2002). A widely followed practice in the relevant literature suggests employing the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter with the standard smoothing parameter λ = 1600. However, this assumes perfect knowledge of all future expected output observations since it estimates trend output based on a two-sided filter. Alternative formulations of this filter address some of the drawbacks with the standard version but these alternatives remain more ad hoc than the definitions we rely upon in the empirical work below.
implies that the central bank increases its policy rate in response to higher inflation (growth) forecast uncertainty. In such a situation, the central bank is more averse to overshooting its inflation or growth target than to undershoot it. The opposite holds for negative (and significant) values of γ 1 or γ 2 . Then, the central bank's loss function is asymmetric in a sense that an undershooting of the respective target is the bigger concern. Finally, the variables i T t , E t π t+12 − π * , and E t y t+12 − y * are defined as above and (M2) is estimated using OLS. 
Empirical Results

Euro Area
, and γ 2 /(1 − ρ i,1 − ρ i,2 ) and provide useful information about the long-run adjustment of the policy rate to the explanatory variables.
We observe a high degree of interest rate smoothing as indicated by the sum of the parameters ρ i,1 and ρ i,2 (0.81 in the baseline specification and 0.84 in the augmented specification). We also have evidence for persistent monetary policy shocks as the autoregressive error term is significant in both specifications as well.
Roughly 55 to 57 percent of the last period's shock carries over to the current period.
The so-called Taylor principle is met as a 1 percentage point (pp) increase in the expected inflation gap is associated with a raise of the nominal interest rate by more than 1 pp in both specifications (2.1 pp and 2.4 pp, respectively). In addition, the ECB also puts considerable weight on output stabilization as the coefficient is significant and even above Taylor's normative guidepost of 0.5 in both specifications (1.6 pp and 1.3 pp, respectively). Finally, the estimates of the uncertainty indicators are quite revealing. The ECB significantly reacts to inflation forecast uncertainty but not to GDP growth forecast uncertainty. The negative sign implies that ECB officials feared overshooting the inflation objective more than undershooting it. in the baseline specification and 1.3 in the augmented specification). Finally, the Riksbank also responds to inflation forecast uncertainty. The reaction, however, is not as profound as that of the ECB, as the coefficient on γ 1 is smaller and significant only at the ten percent level. Notes: Estimation of (M1) (left panel) and (M2) (right panel) using OLS. Number of observations: 76. Steady state coefficients are obtained by setting i T t = i T t−1 = i T t−2 . σ: standard error of regression; AIC: Akaike information criterion; SC: Schwarz criterion. 
Sweden
The United Kingdom
. σ: standard error of regression; AIC: Akaike information criterion; SC: Schwarz criterion.
Discussion
The uncertainty of inflation forecasts is negatively reflected in the reaction function was the first clear indication that the financial crisis was affecting the ECB's and the Riksbank's interest rate policy. Table 5 sets out the estimates for a modification of (M2) which allows for separate estimates for the uncertainty of inflation forecasts and the uncertainty of growth forecasts before 2008Q4, denoted as γ 1,pre and γ 2,pre , and thereafter, denoted as γ 1,cri and γ 2,cri . The ECB's reaction to forecast uncertainty is statistically the same before and during the financial crisis. In case of the Riksbank, however, the reaction to inflation forecast uncertainty and growth forecast uncertainty is statistically different before 2008Q4 compared to the later subsample. In fact, the overall result for inflation forecast uncertainty in Table 3 is driven by the reaction during the financial crisis subsample as the Riksbank did not react significantly to inflation forecast uncertainty before 2008Q4 but very strongly thereafter. Interestingly, the Riksbank decreased its target rate in response to GDP growth forecast uncertainty before 2008Q4 and increased it after, thereby also partly offsetting the negative response to inflation forecast uncertainty during the financial crisis.
Conclusions
In this paper, we derive a modification of a forward-looking Taylor Coef.
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